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The Deterioration of the South Korean Real Estate 
Market and the Response of the Government
Summary
1. South Korea was the first major nation to recover from the recessionary slump 
triggered by the Lehman shock, and in 2010 it achieved 6.2% growth. One factor that 
could affect future economic performance as the underlying recovery trend continues 
is the expanding impact of a deteriorating real estate market.
2. Reasons for the worsening state of the real estate market include (1) government 
moves to strengthen measures designed to curb housing prices, which began to surge 
in 2005, (2) increased construction activity by real estate development companies in 
anticipation of bullish demand, and (3) the sudden deceleration of the economy after 
in the wake of the Lehman shock.
3. Also significant are structural factors, including the dramatic deceleration of new 
town development and population growth. The first phase of new town development 
was largely completed by the mid-1990s, but while a second phase was launched in 
the early 2000s, a fall in the population growth rate resulting from an accelerating 
decline in the birth rate has prompted a review of housing supplies.
4. In addition to its negative impact on the earnings of construction companies, 
this deterioration in the real estate market is also having a widening impact in other 
areas, including an increase in the amount of non-performing loans held by financial 
institutions. Particularly significant is the rapidly deteriorating financial positions of 
savings banks, which expanded their lending for real estate projects during the real 
estate development boom.
5.  Economic performance could be seriously affected if the impact of this situation 
continues to expand. For this reason in mid-2010 the government began to imple-
ment measures in response to the worsening finances of savings banks and the state 
of the real estate market. In 2011 the business operations of eight savings banks were 
suspended because of the worsening financial positions.
6. Risks relating to household debt will need to be monitored closely. An increase 
in housing-related lending has caused household debt to swell in recent years, and by 
the end of 2010 that debt was equivalent to 1.52 times disposable income. According 
to household budget survey results, interest payments have risen from 2.0% of aver-
age household expenditure (excluding single-person households) in 2003 to 2.6% in 
2010.
7. In July 2010, the policy interest rate was raised for the first time in almost two 
years, reflecting progress toward economic recovery. Since then, increases in food 
and raw material prices have caused inflation to accelerate, leading to further interest 
rate hikes in November, January and March.
8. The Bank of Korea has hitherto taken the view that the situation will not destabi-
lize the financial system. Its grounds for this belief include the fact that the quality of 
lending has been maintained through tighter restrictions on housing-related lending, 
and the fact that high-income borrowers have accounted for a large share of debt. 
However, while debt repayments are increasing, if rising primary product prices 
cause the income terms of trade to deteriorate (loss of income to other countries), 
leading to income stagnation, there could be a rapid decline in the capacity of people 
in middle and lower income brackets to service debt. Future household budget trends 
will need to be monitored carefully.
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South Korea was the first major nation to re-
cover from the recessionary slump triggered by 
the Lehman shock, and in 2010 it achieved 6.2% 
growth. Although it continues to follow an under-
lying recovery trend driven by expanding domes-
tic and external demand, its future economic per-
formance could be significantly impacted by the 
spreading effects of a worsening situation in the 
real estate market.
Housing prices in Seoul Special City began to 
fall in mid-2008. They subsequently rose for a pe-
riod in step with the subsequent economic recov-
ery but then returned to a downward trend. This 
downturn in the real estate market has adversely 
affected the earnings of construction companies 
and caused an increase in the amount of bad loans 
held by financial institutions. In particular, there 
has been a dramatic worsening of the financial 
positions of saving banks, which expanded their 
lending on real estate projects during the real es-
tate development boom. Concerned that this situa-
tion would have a serious impact on the economy 
if the effects were allowed to spread, the govern-
ment has taken action since mid-2010 to rescue 
savings banking and revitalize the real estate 
market. These policies helped trigger a sudden 
rise in the number of real estate transactions, rais-
ing hopes in some quarters of a market recovery. 
However, there was also concern about the effects 
of interest rate increases. In July and November 
of 2010 and January and March 2011, the central 
bank raised interest rates with the aim of normal-
izing interest levels and curbing inflation. Further 
increases are predicted. Household debt has swol-
len significantly with the expansion of housing 
loans, which means that higher interest rates not 
only increase the debt servicing costs but could 
also turn some housing loans into non-performing 
assets
In this article, we will focus on these perspec-
tives as we analyze the factors that triggered this 
downturn in the South Korean real estate market 
and are causing its impact to spread. We will also 
examine future risk factors. The article is struc-
tured as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of 
the South Korean economy. In Part 2 we will ana-
lyze the factors that triggered the real estate down-
turn and are causing its impact to spread. Part 
3 focuses on the new town development trend, 
which is closely linked to the housing problem. In 
Part 4 we will look at government measures and 
the risk factors that are expected to emerge in the 
future.
1. Continued Stable Economic 
Growth
South Korea’s economic performance deterio-
rated after the onset of the Lehman shock in the 
fall of 2008. However, the economy rapidly re-
covered thanks to an export rally and government 
moves to stimulate economic activity. In 2010, 
the growth of exports and capital investment ac-
celerated and there was a sustained upward trend 
in consumer spending. Over the year the economy 
grew by 6.2%.
Contributions to growth in 2010 included 7.2% 
from exports (negative 7.8% from imports), 4.0% 
from gross capital formation, and 2.2% from pri-
vate consumption expenditure (Fig. 1), indicating 
that the recovery so far has been driven largely by 
a rapid export rally. The growth impetus provided 
by exports is the result of globalization efforts by 
Fig. 1   Growth Contributions of 
Demand Items in South Korea
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System
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South Korean companies(1).
This rapid recovery was followed by a reaction 
that pushed the growth rate down to 2.1% in the 
January-March quarter, 1.4% in the April-June 
quarter, 0.6% in the July-September quarter, and 
0.5% in the October-December quarter. However, 
both domestic and external demand currently re-
main on stable growth trends.
Customs-cleared exports have consistently 
showed double-digit year-on-year growth since 
November 2009, and in March 2011 there was a 
30.3% increase. There is a strong possibility that 
exports to developed countries will be signifi-
cantly below 2010 levels in 2011. However, the 
growth of exports to emerging countries, includ-
ing those in Asia, is expected to be comparatively 
high for a number of reasons. First, China and 
India are expected to maintain growth rates in ex-
cess of 8%. Second, soaring resource prices will 
have a positive effect on resource-producing coun-
tries. Third, consumer spending is expected to fol-
low a steep upward trend because of the expansion 
of the middle classes. The expansion of exports is 
also likely to benefit from the determined efforts 
of South Korea companies to develop markets in 
emerging economies, and by the fact that the ap-
preciation of the won has been kept to a reason-
able level.
At the same time, the growth of private con-
sumption expenditure has tended to decelerate, 
with the quarterly rate of increase falling from 
1.4% (3.6% year-on-year) in the July-September 
quarter and 0.3% (2.9% year-on-year) in the Oc-
tober-December quarter. However, real retail sales 
remain firm and continue to show steady growth. 
Reasons for this include an improving income and 
employment environment and the fact that interest 
rates have remained low.
South Korea still faces structural problems, in-
cluding youth unemployment and informal labor. 
However, its seasonally adjusted unemployment 
rate stood at 4.0% in February 2011. The income 
recovery is continuing, aided by improvement in 
the income terms of trade. Furthermore, real gross 
domestic income (GDI) increased by 4.6% in the 
July-September quarter of 2010 and by 3.9% in 
the October December quarter relative to the same 
periods in the previous year (Fig. 2). Since GDI 
also includes business profits, it does not necessar-
ily reflect household income trends. However, the 
results of household budget surveys show similar 
income trends. In the October-December quarter, 
real incomes increased by 2.8% over the same pe-
riod in the previous year on an average household 
basis.
As far as interest rates are concerned, the cen-
tral bank drastically cut the policy interest rate in 
response to developments in the wake of the Le-
hman shock, including a rapid worsening of the 
economic situation and a reduction in lending by 
financial institutions (Fig. 3). Liquidity was sup-
plied through bond purchasing and other means. 
Aggressive government spending and monetary 
easing also helped to underpin the recovery.
In July 2010 the rate was lifted again in re-
sponse to the progress of the economic recovery 
and inflationary pressure. Subsequent rises in the 
cost of living resulting from sharp rises in food 
and raw material prices (Fig. 4) led to additional 
interest rate increases in November 2010 and in 
January and March of 2011. However, in mid-
March real interest rates were still negative, since 
the yield on three-month CDs (monthly aver-
Fig. 2   Rates of Increase in Real GDI 
and Private Consumption 
Expenditure (Year-on-Year)
Notes: The income terms of trade index is compared on a 
year-on-year basis.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System
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age) stood at 3.4%, compared with an expected 
inflation rate of 3.9% in March (Bank of Korea, 
Consumer Survey Index). One reason why fur-
ther interest rate increases have been postponed is 
the risk that higher interest rates would trigger an 
influx of short-term overseas funds, causing the 
won’s rise to accelerate. Another reason was the 
risk of further deterioration in the real estate mar-
ket, as discussed below.
2. The Impact of the Emerging Real 
Estate Slump
Despite the underlying economic recovery 
trend, the spreading impact of the deteriorating 
situation in the real estate market could have a 
major influence on future economic performance. 
In Part 2, we will focus on the factors that are 
causing this downturn in the real estate market, 
and on the effects of the situation.
(1) Housing Price Decline
The real estate market continues to worsen de-
spite the rapid economic recovery. As discussed 
below, this is because the emerging effects of 
measures implemented by the government before 
the Lehman shock to curb real estate investment 
combined with the effects of post-Lehman devel-
opments. 
Around 40% of South Korean households live 
in apartments, which are defined as condomini-
um-style housing similar to the Japanese “man-
sion” in buildings with five or more floors. Some 
70-80% of all new housing units fall into this cat-
egory. There are four ways to take up residence 
in an apartment. First, you can purchase a con-
dominium unit. Second, you can use the chonse 
system, whereby the tenant lives rent-free after 
paying a refundable deposit equivalent to 30-70% 
of the purchase price. Third, you can pay a mix-
ture of deposit and rent under the wolse system. 
Fourth, you can simply pay rent without paying 
any deposit. The chonse system is unique to South 
Korea. Landlords earn income by investing the de-
posits(2). Public rental apartments for low-income 
people are usually provided under the wolse sys-
tem, and tenants pay a monthly rent.
The government has intervened deeply in the 
housing market in terms of both supply and price 
formation. Supply-related measures include the 
formulation of housing supply plans, new town 
development, the supply of housing to low-income 
people through public corporations, and loan sup-
port. Government involvement in price formation 
Fig. 3   Trends in the Policy Interest 
Rate
Notes: The most recent figure is for March 2011.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System
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has included the imposition of upper limits on 
selling prices(3).
We will look now at the background to the cur-
rent downturn in the real estate market. In 2003, 
the government began to implement real estate-
related measures in response to sharp increases in 
apartment purchase prices in Seoul Special City 
between 2002 and 2003 (Fig. 5 and Table 1)(4). 
One of these measures provided for the reduction 
of the number of large apartment buildings target-
ed for investment, and for an increase in the per-
centage of small and medium-sized apartments. 
The upward trend in prices slowed temporarily as 
a result of these measures but began to accelerate 
again in 2005 and 2006. The rate of increase was 
especially conspicuous in the Gangnam district 
(see below) located to the south of the Han River 
(Fig. 6). In addition to actual demand, this trend 
was also driven by the myth of real estate’s invin-
cibility, which encouraged people to buy apart-
ments for investment purposes.
The causes of this upward movement in hous-
ing prices were persistently low interest rates and 
investment-driven demand(5). For this reason, the 
policy interest rate was raised in stages, starting 
in the fall of 2005 (Fig. 3), and in August 2005 
the government announced a comprehensive real 
estate policy designed to curb prices. At the core 
of this policy was an increase in the transfer taxes 
levied on owners of multiple dwellings. Previous-
Table 1  Real Estate-Related Measures in South Korea
Main Real Estate-Related Policies
2003 May Ban on resale of subdivision rights extended to whole of the Seoul National Capital Area
Ban on resale of condominium subdivision rights relating to housing, residential/commercial buildings and 
condominiums owned by redevelopment syndicates in speculative zones
September Required percentage of small and medium-sized dwellings to be built during redevelopment/reconstruction 
increased to 60%
Tightening of tax exemption conditions for transfer taxes on single-household dwellings
October Accelerated construction of long-term public rental housing (target of 1.5 million units)
New town development
Levying of development profits on rebuilt condominium buildings
Introduction of permit system for the trading of dwellings
Increase in permit area for land transactions
2005 February Bond-bidding system introduced in response to rising new town subdivision prices
Survey of situation in six housing transaction declaration zones in Seoul
August Threshold for general real estate tax reduced from 900 million won to 600 million won
50% transfer tax imposed on households with two or more dwellings Registration of actual transaction prices
Expansion of supply, including new town development in Gambuk district
2006 March Levying of excessive profits resulting from condominium reconstruction
DTI limited to 40% in speculative zones
November Controls on housing-secured loans tightened
Downward guidance of subdivision prices
Announcement of road map for supply expansion
2007 January Fund established to procure funding for rental housing construction
Revitalization of supply of long-term fixed-interest mortgage lending
Expansion of guarantee support for lending to low/middle-income people
2009 Purchase of unsold newly built housing and land from domestic construction firms wishing to repay debts?2 
trillion won allocated for housing purchases and 3 trillion for land purchases
2010 August Partial easing of restrictions on real estate lending
Source: Lee Duk-soon [2008], etc.
Fig. 5   Housing prices in Seoul 
Special City (Year-on Year 
Comparisons)
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System
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ly a progressive tax ranging from 9% to 36% was 
levied when a single household owned more than 
two dwellings, but in 2007 the top rate was lifted 
to 50%. In addition, the government introduced 
a plan to alleviate the urban housing shortage by 
developing housing on 660 hectares of govern-
ment and municipal land in Songpa-gu to create 
a new town with capacity for 50,000 households, 
and to increase housing land development in areas 
currently under development, such as Ginpo New 
Town.
In 2006, the government reduced the approved 
loan-to-value ratio (the ratio of housing loans to 
housing values) and the debt-to-income (DTI) ra-
tio, which is the ratio between annual principal 
and interest payments and annual income in the 
Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu and Songpa-gu districts 
of Seoul Special City, which had been designated 
as “speculative zones” because of a continuing 
steep uptrend in housing prices. The loan-to-value 
requirement was now among the toughest in the 
world.
Despite these government measures targeting 
the real estate industry, prices continued to rise, 
and real estate developers continued to build hous-
ing in anticipation of bullish demand. Evidence of 
this pattern can be found in the fact that the area 
of new buildings approved in 2007 was the big-
gest since 2000 (Fig. 7).
Gradually these measures to curb real estate 
lending began to take effect, as evidenced by a de-
cline in the rate of increase in M2 in 2007 (though 
there was a shift to monetary easing after the Leh-
man shock), and by a decline in housing-related 
lending as a percentage of total lending to house-
holds (Fig. 8). Just as this situation was beginning 
Fig. 6   Housing Prices
Source: CEIC Data Base
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to trigger a rapid slowing of the pace of upward 
movement in housing prices, the unexpected im-
pact of the Lehman shock caused the economy 
to stall. As a result, housing prices fell below the 
previous year’s level in April 2009.
Despite the subsequent rapid recovery of eco-
nomic performance, prices again slid onto a nega-
tive trend in August 2010 (Fig. 5). In addition to 
reduced demand, the fall in housing prices also 
resulted from discounted selling of stocks. While 
the extent of the decline was not large overall, 
some properties in the Gangnam district dropped 
by more than 10% from their peak values. The im-
pact of this situation on the South Korean public 
was especially shocking because of the myth of 
real estate’s invincibility, which become firmly es-
tablished during years of continuous rises in hous-
ing prices.
The deteriorating situation in the real estate 
market over the past few years has resulted from 
a combination of factors, including (1) govern-
ment moves to tighten real estate-related policies 
in response to rapid housing price increases since 
2005, (2) housing construction by developers in 
anticipation of bullish demand, and (3) the sudden 
stalling of the economy after the Lehman shock. 
In addition to these direct factors, the expansion 
of the housing supply as a result of the govern-
ment’s new town development activities also ap-
pears to have played a role. (This last factor will 
be examined in Part 3.)
(2) Spreading Effects
As outlined below, the impact of this deterio-
ration in the real estate market have been mani-
fested in a number of areas. First, there has been a 
decline in the business performance of construc-
tion and real estate companies. While exports 
increased by 14.5% and capital investment by 
25.0% year on year in 2010, construction invest-
ment shrank by 1.4%.
Faced with a slump in domestic construction 
activity, major construction firms have focused on 
winning overseas contracts. However, this path is 
not open to small and medium construction firms, 
many of which have gone bankrupt because of 
their inability to collect contract payments. Ac-
cording to the Construction Association of Korea, 
306 firms failed in 2010 (Korea Times, January 
31, 2011). In addition, the situation has forced 
the postponement of some major development 
projects and is even affecting the government’s 
new town construction projects. Many real estate 
agents have also been forced to close their doors 
because of a rapid decline in transaction numbers.
Evidence of the downturn in the construction in-
dustry can be found in the fact the sector’s growth 
rate has remained below the real GDP growth rate 
(year-on-year, the same applies below) since the 
April-June quarter of 2009, when the benefits of 
economic stimulus measures began to wane. This 
was especially apparent in the October-December 
quarter of 2010, when the construction sector re-
corded negative growth of 3.2% compared with 
a GDP real growth rate of 4.7%. The real estate 
agency service business also continues to stagnate 
with almost zero growth for two consecutive quar-
ters (Fig. 9).
Second, there has been an increase in the 
amount of non-performing loans held by financial 
institutions. Mutual savings banks (equivalent to 
Japanese shinkin banks, referred to below as “sav-
ings banks”), of which there are 105 as of Decem-
Fig. 9   Growth Rates of Real GDP and 
Construction Sector  
(Year-on-Year)
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System
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ber 2010, have been particularly hard hit. With 
20-30% of their project loans now classed as non-
performing loans, their financial positions have 
deteriorated. Lending to households by savings 
banks peaked out in 2005 and has since declined, 
in contrast with a conspicuous increase in their 
lending to businesses (Fig. 10). From 40.6% of 
total lending in 2002, lending to households had 
shrunk to just 11.8% by 2010.
In response to the worsening financial situation 
of savings banks, the government initiated rescue 
measures. On January 14, 2011, the Financial Ser-
vices Commission designated the Samwha Mutual 
Savings Bank a bankrupt financial institution and 
imposed a six-month suspension. The bank, which 
is ranked 20th in terms of assets, is based in Seoul 
Special City, where it has its head office and 
branches in Samseong-dong in the Gangnam-gu 
district in Sinchon in the Seodaemun-gu district. 
It has over 43,000 depositors. The deposit insur-
ance corporation announced that it would guaran-
tee all deposits and interest up to 50 million won 
per depositor. In February, six-month suspensions 
were imposed on six more banks, including South 
Korea’s biggest savings bank, the Busan Savings 
Bank, and its affiliate, the Daejeon Savings Bank. 
At the end of 2010, the total assets of savings 
banks were equivalent to only 4.9% of the total 
assets of all banks (Table 2), and the impact on 
the financial system as a whole will be minimal. 
However, the banks have tightened their evalua-
tion criteria for loans to the construction sector, 
with the result that the amount of non-performing 
loans has increased.
Non-performing loans held by banks have in-
creased from 16.0 trillion won in December 2009 
to 24.4 trillion won in December 2010. Over the 
same period, the amount of real estate project 
loans classified as non-performing loans has risen 
from 1.2 trillion won to 6.4 trillion won, while the 
non-performing loan ratio has soared from 2.32% 
to 16.44% (Fig. 11). The reduction since Septem-
ber is attributable to the disposal of non-perform-
Fig. 10  Lending by Savings Banks
Notes: Balances at end of June
Source: Korea Financial Supervisory Service
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Table 2  Financial Institutions in South Korea
?Banks
a. General banks
Commercial banks… Kookmin Bank, Shinhan Bank, Woori Bank, 
Hana Bank, etc. 
Regional banks… Busan Bank, Daegu Bank, Kyeongnam Bank,
Foreign-owned banks
b. Special banks Korea Development Bank, Korea, Export-Import Bank of Korea, Industrial 
Bank of Korea
?Non-bank
  depository institutions
a. General financial corporations
b. Mutual savings banks
c. Credit unions
d. Post office savings
?Securities companies,
  asset management
  companies
?Insurance companies
?Others
Source: Bank of Korea, etc.
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projects, such as the construction of new towns, 
innovation cities and Sejong Special City. Already 
heavily burdened with debt at the time of its estab-
lishment, the Korea Land & Housing Corporation 
has seen its debts increase by 16.5 trillion won to 
125.7 trillion won (approximately ¥9.35 trillion) 
in the year since October 2009 (Chosun Ilbo, Feb-
ruary 14, 2011). Reasons for this increase include 
the postponement of new town construction, hous-
ing development and other activities because of 
the worsening situation in the real estate market, 
and the purchasing of unsold housing stocks.
Fourth, there is the impact on households. The 
percentage of home equity loans classified as non-
performing loans is still low at 0.49% (as of De-
cember 2010). However, the situation is also af-
fecting households in various ways. Some people 
have used bank loans to purchase newly built con-
dominiums, only to be forced to sell them below 
the purchase price because of their inability to sell 
their present dwellings. In addition, the postpone-
ment of new town projects has meant that a sig-
nificant number of people moving out of areas tar-
geted for construction are now unsure when they 
will be able to repay their home loans, for which 
they are relying on compensation from the Korea 
Land & Housing Corporation.
Of greater concern is the likely future impact 
on households. Interest rates have been increased 
four times since July 2010 because of strength-
ening inflationary pressure, and further increases 
are anticipated. Higher interest rates will swell 
the debt repayment  burden, and there is a risk 
that some housing equity loans will be turned into 
non-performing loans. (This point will be exam-
ined in Part 4.)
3. Housing Problems and New Town 
Development
We will look next at the concentration of popu-
lation in metropolitan Seoul and new town devel-
opment activities, both of which are linked to the 
real estate problems of recent years.
ing loans, including sales of collateral and sales 
and write-downs of loans. Project loans make up 
only a small percentage of total loans (3.2% as of 
December 2010). In addition, banks have taken 
early action to dispose of non-performing loans 
under government guidance. For these reasons, the 
situation will have only a limited impact on the 
financial positions of banks. However, we need to 
be aware of the possibility that the interest rate in-
creases could turn a growing amount of real estate 
loans to households into non-performing loans.
Third, the debts of the Korea Land & Housing 
Corporation are mounting. This is the result of 
Corporation’s purchasing of part of stocks of un-
sold housing to support the construction sector.
The Korea Land & Housing Corporation is a 
government corporation created in September 
2009 through the merger of the Korea Land Cor-
poration with the Korean National Housing Cor-
poration as part of the privatization program in-
troduced by the Lee Myung-bak administration. 
In addition to activities in such areas as industrial 
parks, special economic zones and overseas proj-
ects(6), it also supplies housing to low-income peo-
ple, an area in which there is no competition with 
the private sector, as well as undertaking national 
Fig. 11   Non-Performing Loan Ratio 
for Real Estate Project Loans 
by Banks
Source: Korean Financial Supervisory Service, Press Re-
lease February 14, 2011
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ment and educational opportunities. By the early 
1970s, Seoul was experiencing a serious hous-
ing shortage. This led to the formation of illegal 
squatter settlements, known as “moon villages,” 
on railroad embankments and hillsides and in riv-
er basins. Most of the residents of these communi-
ties were employed in miscellaneous jobs in the 
informal sector.
The government relocated illegal squatters to 
the outskirts of Seoul and increased the supply of 
housing through the redevelopment of inner city 
areas. In 1972, the government passed the Hous-
ing Construction Promotion Law and announced a 
plan to build 2.5 million dwellings over a 10-year 
period. Measures included the introduction of 
low-interest finance and tax relief for companies 
supplying general rental housing (for subdivision 
after five years). The government also imposed 
restrictions on dwelling areas and the number of 
rooms in order to keep prices low. However, the 
supply of housing fell short of the target. Accord-
ing to Koh [2004], this was because large amounts 
of funds were allocated for the development of 
heavy industries, and because anti-speculation 
measures were given a higher priority than the 
supply of housing.
The effects of the housing shortage were espe-
(1) Housing Shortages and New Town Devel-
opment in Seoul
South Korea’s high-growth era between the 
1960s and 1980s was accompanied by a rapid rise 
in the urbanization ratio (urban population as a 
percentage of the total population). The urbaniza-
tion ratio in 1960 was just 27.7%, but by 1985 
it was higher than the ratio for Japan at 64.9% 
(Fig. 12). Today South Korea is one of the most 
urbanized countries in the world. Its urbanization 
ratio, which reached 80.8% in 2005, is exceeded 
only by city states such as Singapore. Rapid ur-
banization has been accompanied by the concen-
tration of population into Seoul Special City (re-
ferred to below as “Seoul”) and the Seoul Nation-
al Capital Area (Seoul Special City, Incheon Met-
ropolitan City, Gyeonggi-do). Between 1960 and 
1980, the population of Seoul increased from 2.45 
million to 8.35 million, and by 1990 it was over 
10 million. From 9.8% in 1960, Seoul’s share of 
the total population of South Korea rose to 22.3% 
in 1980 and 24.4% in 1990 (Fig. 13). Seoul is now 
home to one-quarter of the total population.
In addition to a high birth rate (total fertility 
rate of 4.53 in 1970), a strong tendency to gravi-
tate toward Seoul (the central city)(7)
 drew popula-
tion in from provincial areas in search of employ-
Fig. 12   Urbanization Ratios for Japan 
and South Korea
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
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cially severe for low-income people. Initially, con-
struction of housing for low-income people was 
the responsibility of the Korea National Hous-
ing Corporation, but the work was frustrated by 
limited financial resources. For this reason, the 
National Housing Fund was established in 1981 
to promote the supply of small-scale permanent 
rental dwellings for low-income tenants by pri-
vate sector companies. In addition to providing 
loans to private sector construction companies, it 
was also involved in low-interest lending to low-
income people.
In the 1980s, private sector redevelopment ac-
tivities reached fever pitch with the approach of 
the Seoul Olympics in 1988. Seoul’s cityscape 
was transformed by the construction of large-scale 
apartment buildings, such as the Hyundai Apart-
ments in the Apgujeong-dong district. In many 
years during the 1970s and 1980s, the growth of 
construction investment (buildings) outpaced the 
real GDP growth rate (Fig. 14) and became one of 
the drivers of high economic growth.
Despite the construction of major apartment 
complexes, progress toward the solution of the 
housing shortage was limited, because of popula-
tion growth and the trend toward single-person 
living. In 1988 the government sought to allevi-
ate this problem by introducing the Two Million 
Housing Construction Plan, which was based on a 
promise made by the Roh Tae-woo administration. 
This was a very ambitious plan at a time when 
South Korea still had fewer than 8 million dwell-
ings. The core element in the plan was new town 
development. A new town is defined as a planned 
city resulting from a development project cover-
ing an area of at least 330 hectares. Designed to 
provide self-sufficiency, comfort, convenience, 
security and other benefits, these communities 
are built through policy initiatives. The five new 
towns built during the first phase of this program, 
which were all located Gyeonggi-do, were Bun-
dang in Seongnam City, Ilsan in Goyang City, 
Pyongchon in Anyang City, Jungdong in Bucheon 
City, and in Sanbon in Gunpo City. All are located 
within a 20-25km radius from central Seoul.
We can identify four characteristics of the new 
town developments. First, private sector capital 
was used actively. In this period, the acquisition 
of land for development was carried out by the 
Korea Land Development Corporation (now the 
Korea Land & Housing Corporation), while pri-
vate sector companies were responsible for hous-
ing construction and subdivision under plans that 
stipulated land use and the numbers of dwellings 
of each class. By introducing the advance land 
subdivision system, the Korea Land Development 
Corporation also secured the funds needed for the 
development of infrastructure, such as water sup-
ply systems and roads, from the private sector.
Second, land purchasing and expropriation was 
carried out quickly. The Housing Construction 
Promotion Law gave the Korea Land Develop-
ment Corporation the power to acquire land com-
pulsorily. This was a major reason why new town 
construction projects were completed more rap-
idly than in Japan(8).
Third, the construction of housing for middle-
income people was paralleled by the construction 
of housing for low-income people, which account-
ed for 10% of total construction. Apartments for 
low-income people were basically built by the Ko-
rea National Housing Corporation (now the Korea 
Land & Housing Corporation) and local govern-
Fig. 14   Growth Rates of Real GDP 
and Construction Investment
Notes: There are no data relating exclusively to housing 
investment.
Source: Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information 
Service
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ments using funds provided by the National Hous-
ing Fund.
Fourth, infrastructure, including railroads, ex-
pressways and district heating systems, was devel-
oped through public works projects. Bundang, for 
example, is linked to central Seoul via the Bun-
dang Line subway, which was completed in 1994.
Until the mid-1990s, the Korea Housing Bank 
and the National Housing Fund accounted for over 
80% of housing finance. The Korea Housing Bank 
provides home equity loans to general borrowers, 
while the National Housing Fund lends money 
to low-income people to cover deposits under 
the chonse system, whereby tenants pay deposits 
equivalent to around 70% of the purchase price 
and are then not required to pay monthly rents. In 
addition to housing subsidies under the National 
Basic Living Security Law, systems targeted to-
ward low-income people also include a low-cost 
housing supply policy implemented by Seoul Spe-
cial City, and a housing voucher scheme.
Progress toward deregulation since the 1990s 
has brought a shift from the government to the 
private sector in the area of housing finance. The 
Korea Housing Bank was privatized in 1997 and 
merged with the Kookmin Bank in 2001. Faced 
with a slump in business lending after the curren-
cy crisis, commercial banks turned to household 
finance as a new source of earnings and became 
actively involved in such areas as home equity 
loans, education loans and credit cards. Non-bank 
institutions, such as credit unions and insurance 
companies, also moved into the home equity loan 
market, which consequently doubled in size be-
tween 2001 and 2004.
Despite the rapid expansion of the market, 
most loans were provided over short repayment 
periods until the early 2000s. This was because 
financial institutions tended to avoid long-term 
lending because of the high risks involved. An-
other reason was the fact that many borrowers 
bought homes with the expectation of price in-
creases and would change their dwellings after 
short intervals. In 2004, the government estab-
lished the Korea Housing Finance Corporation 
with the aim of promoting increased use of long-
term fixed-interest loans. The mechanism used 
was as follows. First, financial institutions under 
contract with the KHFC would provide KHFC 
fixed-interest loans (Pokchapari loans)(9). Second, 
the loans would then be sold to the KHFC. Third, 
the KHFC would recover the funds from the capi-
tal market by selling mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS). However, most home equity loans are still 
provided on a short-term, variable-interest basis, 
which is indicative of the large number of homes 
that are bought with a view to resale in anticipa-
tion of price increases.
(2) Changes in the Environment for New 
Towns
The first phase of new town development was 
largely completed in the first half of the 1990s(10), 
and the second phase began in the 2000s. As de-
scribed earlier, the government reacted to soaring 
housing prices in Seoul during the early 2000s by 
designating Ginpo City and Paju City as new town 
development areas.
With the exception of Songpa-gu in Seoul Spe-
cial City, all of projects begun during the second 
phase of new town development are in Gyeonggi-
do. Many of the projects, such as those in Pyeo-
ngtaek City, Dongtan City and Paju City(11) are 
further away from central Seoul than those under-
taken during the first phase. There are several oth-
er differences compared with the first phase. First, 
the area used for housing sites has been reduced 
and more land has been allocated to green areas 
and industrial parks. Second, the area of general 
housing land for high-rise apartment buildings 
has been reduced, and more land has been used 
for housing-only areas with detached housing and 
low-rise apartment buildings. Third, more apart-
ments are being supplied for subdivision rather 
than for rental, and the emphasis is on the creation 
of self-sufficient cities that are generally eco-
friendly and offer high-quality residential environ-
ments. Dongtan City has been designated a model 
city with ubiquitous information technology sys-
tems.
However, by the start of the 2000s South Ko-
rea’s birth rate was falling rapidly. After declin-
ing from 1.71 in 1991 to 1.47 in 2000 (Fig. 15), 
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the total fertility rate reached 1.30, which is lower 
than Japan’s rate, in 2001, and by 2005 it was at 
1.08. The 2009 figure was 1.15. This accelerating 
fall in the birth rate in the 2000s is the result of 
deterioration in the income and employment envi-
ronment since the currency crisis, and the grow-
ing burden of educational expenses(12). The falling 
birthrate has been reflected in slower population 
growth (Fig. 13), and the population is expected 
to shift to a downward trend by 2019. This com-
bination of increased housing supplies and a de-
cline in the population growth rate have brought 
rapid progress toward the alleviation of the hous-
ing shortage. The overall housing diffusion rate 
(number of dwellings/number of households) for 
South Korea has climbed from 72.4% in 1990 to 
109.9% in 2008 (Fig. 16). With the elimination 
of the housing shortage, the number of dwellings 
built has fallen significantly below the level in the 
early 1990s. The housing diffusion rate for Seoul 
has soared from 58% in 1990 to 93.8% in 2008 
(Kim & Cho [2010]), indicating that the quantita-
tive housing shortage has basically been solved. 
The population of Bundang New Town, which 
was built during the first phase and received its 
first residents in 1991, has started to shrink, while 
the aged population has risen 70% over the past 
10 years.
A factor that has a major influence on housing 
demand is the age structure of the population. In 
1970, South Korea’s demographic structure was 
basically pyramid-shaped (Fig. 17). The group 
aged between 10 and 29, which can be expected 
to generate future housing demand as they move 
forward through education, employment, mar-
riage and other stages, made up 39.4% of the to-
tal population. It was this structure that prompted 
the new town developments. The percentage of 
people in the 10-29 age group had fallen to 32.3% 
by 2000 and 27.5% (estimated) by 2010, while 
the number of people in this age group has shrunk 
by about 1.7 million over the past 10 years. This 
change in the environment prompted a shift in the 
focus of housing policy from quantitative expan-
sion to qualitative improvement. The policy goals 
identified in the new housing law introduced in 
2003 are the qualitative improvement of hous-
ing and efficient management of existing housing 
stocks. Apart from cities that have already been 
built, such as Dongtan 1 and Pangyo, plans are 
scaled down and other changes made.
Another reason for this review of the new town 
development program was a return to the central 
city. Large-scale complexes combining offices, 
commercial facilities and dwellings are currently 
being developed in various parts of Seoul, in-
cluding the Gwanghwamun area, the area around 
Fig. 15  Total Fertility Rate
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
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Yongsan Station, and Yeouido. Several factors 
appear to be involved in this trend. First, urban 
redevelopment involves a lighter fiscal burden 
than new town development. Second, while sales 
of housing in new town developments have been 
slow, residents are showing an increasing prefer-
ence for urban living, the advantages of which 
include proximity to work and better access to 
shopping and cultural opportunities. Third, glo-
balization has brought renewed appreciation of 
the clustering effect of cities. Urban clustering is 
seen as offering a number of benefits, including 
improvement in the overall productivity of tertiary 
industries, the formation of cradles for leading 
sectors, and the elimination of long-distance com-
muting(13).
(3) Population Growth in Gyeonggi-do and 
Gangnam
Did new town development alleviate the con-
centration of population in Seoul? A comparison 
of the populations of administrative districts in 
1990 and 2005 using figures from the five-yearly 
population census shows that Seoul’s popula-
tion declined by 840,000 while the populations of 
Gyeonggi-do, where many new towns were built, 
increased by 4 million, and that of Incheon Met-
ropolitan City by 700,000 (Fig. 18). This suggests 
that the aims of the new town development pro-
gram have been achieved to some extent. Howev-
er, the capital is in fact still growing, as evidenced 
by continuing growth in the population of the 
Seoul National Capital Area, including Seoul (Fig. 
12). As of 2005, 48.1% of South Korea’s total 
population was concentrated in the National Capi-
tal Area. The populations of some major regional 
Fig. 18   Changes in Populations of 
Administrative Districts 
(Comparison between 2005 
and 1990)
Source: Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information 
Service
? 2
? 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
?Millions?
Gy
eo
ng
gi-
do
Inc
heo
n M
etro
pol
itan
 
City
Da
ejeo
n M
etro
pol
itan
 
City
Gw
an
gju M
etro
pol
itan
 
City
Da
egu
 
Me
tro
pol
itan
 
City
Ch
un
gch
eo
ng
bu
k-d
o
Je
ju 
Sp
ec
ia
l 
Au
to
no
m
ou
s 
Pr
ov
in
ce
Ga
ng
wo
n-
do
Ch
un
gch
eo
ngn
am
-
do
Gy
eo
ng
sa
ng
bu
k-d
o
Bu
sa
n M
etr
opo
lita
n C
ity
Je
olla
bu
k-d
o
Gy
eo
ngs
an
gna
m
-
do
Je
olla
na
m
-
do
Se
ou
l S
pe
cia
l C
ity
Fig. 17  South Korea’s Population by Age Group
Source: Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information Service
0 2 4 6 8 10
0?9
10?19
20?29
30?39
40?49
50?59
60?69
70?79
80?
?Millions?
2010 2000 1970
16 RIM   Pacific Business and Industries Vol. XI, 2011 No. 40
cities have meanwhile started to shrink(14).
Where are the destinations for those moving 
out of Seoul? Of the 1.93 million residents who 
relocated in 2009, 1.29 million moved within 
Seoul and 640,000 out of the city. By far the 
most popular destination for those leaving Seoul 
was Gyeonggi-do, to which 317,000 people relo-
cated. In second place was Incheon Metropolitan 
City (39,000), followed by Chungcheongnam-do 
(26,000) and Busan Metropolitan City (24,000) 
(Table 3).
In addition to the development of new towns, 
the continuing movement of population into 
Gyeonggi-do was also driven by the growth of 
employment opportunities, mainly resulting from 
the relocation of factories from Seoul, the devel-
opment of new industries and other factors. A 
comparison of each administrative division’s share 
of gross regional production in 2002 and 2008 
(Fig. 19) shows that the three regions with the big-
gest increases were (1) Gyeonggi-do (2.7 points, 
from 17.6% to 20.3%), (2) Chungcheongnam-do 
(1.8 points, from 4.4% to 6.2%), and (3) Gyeong-
sangbuk-do (0.4 points, from 6.6% to 7.0%).
About 40% of South Korea’s IT equipment 
manufacturers are concentrated in Gyeonggi-do 
(Fig. 20). With the introduction of its seventh-
generation products, LG Display shifted its pro-
duction from Gumi City in Gyeongsangbuk-do to 
a factory in Paju City. This induced small and me-
dium parts manufacturers to move into Paju, re-
sulting in the formation of an LCD display cluster 
in the city. A growing number of foreign-owned 
companies, including Japanese-owned companies, 
meanwhile moved into Pyeongtaek City.
A comparison between 1990 and 2005 shows a 
decline in Seoul’s population during that period. 
If we look at individual years, however, we find 
that its population peaked out in 1992 and fell 
consistently thereafter until 2003, before shift-
ing to a gradual growth trend in 2004. By 2009, 
Seoul’s population was 190,000 greater than 
2004. In 2009, population inflows exceeded out-
flows in six of Seoul’s 25 districts (Seodaemun-gu, 
Eunpyeong-gu, Gangnam-gu, Songpa-gu, Seocho-
gu, Gangdong-gu). With the exception of Seo-
daemun-gu and Eunpyeong, all are located to the 
south of the Han River (Fig. 21). Gangnam-gu, 
Songpa-gu and Seocho-gu are generally referred 
to as the Gangnam area. They are regarded as elite 
residential areas and have many high-class res-
taurants, boutiques, imported car dealerships and 
similar businesses. Because Seoul High School, 
Table 3   Population Movement in 
Seoul (2009)
Destination Number
Seoul Special City 1,286,855
Gyeonggi-do 317,952
Incheon Metropolitan City 38,858
Chungcheongnam-do 26,072
Busan Metropolitan City 24,459
Gangwon-do 24,376
Jeollabuk-do 21,188
Gyeongsangbuk-do 19,784
Gyeongsangnam-do 19,615
Jeollanam-do 19,007
Daejeon Metropolitan City 17,439
Chungcheongbuk-do 15,612
Daegu Metropolitan City 15,469
Gwangju Metropolitan City 14,035
Jeju Special Autonomous Province 5,955
Source: Seoul Statistical Yearbook 2010
Fig. 19   Administrative Divisions in 
South Korea
1. Seoul Special City
2. Busan Metropolitan City
3. Daegu Metropolitan City
4. Incheon Metropolitan City
5. Gwangju Metropolitan City
6. Daejeon Metropolitan City
7. Ulsan Metropolitan City
8. Gyeonggi-do
9. Gangwon-do
10. Chungcheongbuk-do
11. Chungcheongnam-do
12. Jeollabuk-do
13. Jeollanam-do
14. Gyeongsangbuk-do
15. Gyeongsangnam-do
16. Jeju Special Autonomous Province
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Kyunggi High School and other educational in-
stitutions have relocated to the area, many people 
see the educational environment as a key reason 
for moving to the Gangnam area. With just 16.1% 
of Seoul’s total population, the Gangnam area ac-
counts for about one-third of the city’s educational 
institutions, including preparatory schools.
One reason for population growth in the Gang-
nam area is the growth of employment oppor-
tunities. The systematic development of quality 
infrastructure including expressways, wide roads 
and IT infrastructure, as well as excellent airport 
access, have increasingly induced companies to 
establish new headquarters in the area, and the 
Samsung Group has relocated its head office there 
from the Gangpuk area (north of the Han River). 
A growing number of globally active companies 
are centralizing their head office in the Gangnam 
area. This has led in turn to the growth of the fi-
nance and insurance industries, and to the devel-
opment of advanced business service industries, 
including ICT, accounting, legal services, consult-
ing, design and advertising. As a result of these 
and other changes, the Gangnam area is assuming 
the characteristics of a global urban center(15).
An analysis of the employment structure in the 
Gangnam area (Fig. 22) shows that business ser-
vices account for a large share of jobs, while the 
percentage working in manufacturing industries is 
low. Financial institutions have traditionally been 
concentrated in Jung-gu (between Chungmuro 
Avenue and Euljiro Avenue), while securities 
companies have clustered in Yeungdeungpo-gu, 
where Yeouido is situated, since the relocation of 
the stock exchange in 1979. While the concentra-
tion of finance and insurance sector businesses in 
the Gangnam area is not especially high, there-
fore, the percentage of business service companies 
in the area is conspicuously high. The growth of 
specialized business services is creating a high-in-
Fig. 20   Numbers of IT Equipment 
Manufacturers by Region
Gyeonggi-do
Gyeongsangbuk-do
Incheon
Metropolitan
City
Gyeongsangnam-do
Chungcheongbuk-do
Chungcheongnam-do
Busan Metropolitan City
Seoul
Special
City
Notes: IT equipment includes electronic components, 
computers, communications equipment, precision 
instruments, optical instruments and electrical ma-
chinery.
Source: Korea Statistical Yearbook 2009
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come stratum. At the same time, there is increas-
ing demand for low-income service workers to 
provide maintenance and security services for ho-
tels and other commercial buildings, to carry out 
essential urban maintenance tasks, such as clean-
ing, and to work for businesses providing services 
to high-income people, such as restaurants, shops, 
sports and leisure facilities and cleaning compa-
nies.
4. Government Initiatives Moving into 
High Gear, Risks for the Future
In one sense, the fall in housing prices was an 
outcome for which the government was hoping. 
However, if impact of the worsening situation in 
the real estate market is allowed to spread further, 
it could have a serious impact on the economy, 
and for this reason the government has started to 
take action.
(1) Government Initiatives Moving into High 
Gear
Stagnating construction investment is one of 
the indications that the real estate market slump is 
starting to impact on the real economy. The gov-
ernment has begun to take steps in response to this 
situation since the second half of 2010.
One of those steps has been increased efforts to 
deal with the problems of savings banks. React-
ing to increases in the non-performing loans of 
savings banks, the Financial Supervisory Service 
(FSS) stated that almost 30% of the 11.9 trillion 
won balance of project finance as of June 2010 
could become non-performing loans. The govern-
ment decided to inject 2.8 trillion won of capital 
into savings banks that were experiencing finan-
cial difficulties, and to buy non-performing loans. 
The loans will be bought by a structural adjust-
ment fund established by the government, and by 
the Korea Asset Management Corporation.
Early in 2011, a series of suspension orders 
were issued against financially troubled savings 
banks. On January 14, the Financial Service Com-
mission (FSC) declared that the Samwha Mutual 
Savings Bank, the 20th biggest savings banks in 
terms of assets, was a bankrupt financial institu-
tion and imposed a six-month suspension. The 
FSC also announced that it would offer financially 
weak savings banks for sale to major commercial 
banks that have the required financial resources.
On February 17, six-month suspensions were 
also imposed on South Korea’s biggest savings 
bank, the Busan Savings Bank, and its affiliate, 
the Daejeon Savings Bank, on the grounds that 
their capital adequacy ratios had fallen below 5%. 
Established in 1972 as the Busan Savings Bank, 
the Busan Savings Bank achieved rapid growth 
through an aggressive acquisition strategy. Its af-
filiates include the Busan II Savings Bank, the 
Central Busan Savings Bank, the Daejeon Sav-
ings Bank and the Jeonju Savings Bank. After 
concerned depositors began to withdraw large 
amounts of money from banks affiliated to the 
Busan Savings Bank, the FSC imposed suspen-
sions on four banks, including the Busan II Sav-
ings Bank, which was affected by inadequate li-
quidity, the Central Busan Savings Bank and the 
Jeonju Savings Bank, at a special meeting held on 
February 19. The FSC also announced a number 
of measures to minimize the impact of the suspen-
sions. First, depositors would be allowed to make 
provisional withdrawals of deposits protected by 
the Deposit Insurance Corporation within two 
weeks (normally three weeks). Second, depositors 
in urgent need of funds would be able to obtain 
loans of up to 15 million won from four banks (in-
cluding the Kookmin Bank and the Pusan Bank). 
Third, measures to help low-income people would 
include the reinforcement of micro-credit servic-
es. In addition, steps would be taken to strengthen 
the finances of savings banks by buying non-per-
forming loans and supplying liquidity through the 
Korea Savings Bank Association.
The run on deposits continued in some areas, 
and on February 21 the Domin Savings Bank vol-
untarily suspended operations, prompting the FSC 
to impose a suspension. By early March, eight 
savings banks had been suspended (Table 4).
FSC officials indicated that there was no possi-
bility of further suspensions, since liquidity short-
ages resulting from runs on deposits were concen-
trated in the Pusan area, and because of increases 
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in the deposits of the 94 savings banks with BIS 
ratios over 5%.
Most people accepted that the rescue of the sav-
ings banks was essential from the viewpoint of 
maintaining the stability of the financial system. 
However, there was also criticism that a rescue 
could create increased moral hazards. Despite the 
fact that savings banks were established primar-
ily as financial institutions designed to provide 
support to low-income people, whose access to 
loans from commercial banks is limited, they had 
incurred non-performing loans by increasing their 
involving in project finance during the real es-
tate boom. For this reason, it was thought that the 
managers of savings banks should be held to ac-
count. Some thought that the financial supervisory 
authorities should bear some of the blame because 
of their decision to ease lending ceilings at such a 
time.
On March 17, measures to improve the finan-
cial soundness of savings banks were announced. 
One of those measures was the abolition of a rule 
that allowed savings banks with capital adequacy 
ratios of 8% or higher and non-performing loan 
ratios of 8% or lower to lend up to 20% of their 
capital. In addition, a new rule was introduced, in 
principle limiting the amount that could be lent to 
a single borrower to 10 billion won.
Another measure was the partial easing of re-
strictions on real estate lending with the aim of 
revitalizing real estate transactions. The main 
measures introduced in August 2010 included (1) 
the abolition (by March 2011) of restrictions on 
total debt repayment ratios in areas not designated 
as speculative zones, (2) support for housing pur-
chases by low- and middle-income people (loans 
of up to 200 million won for housing purchases 
by households with annual incomes of 40 mil-
lion won or lower), (3) the extension of the grace 
period for extra tax on asset transfer income, and 
(4) the extension of housing registration tax ex-
emptions. The government is also considering 
measures to stimulate the construction industry, 
including increased purchasing of unsold housing, 
with the goal of achieving 5% growth in 2011.
In part because of the easing of restrictions on 
real estate lending, apartment sales in Seoul be-
gan to increase conspicuously in October 2010 
(Fig. 23). In addition, real estate prices shifted to 
a positive year-on-year trend in February (Fig. 5). 
The government was expected to extend the eas-
ing of restriction on real estate lending, but on 
March 22, it decided to terminate the measure as 
planned at the end of March. At the same time, it 
announced a 50% reduction in real estate acquisi-
tion taxes, subject to certain conditions, until the 
end of 2011, a move intended to stimulate real es-
tate transactions.
These changes make it difficult to predict trends 
in the real estate market after April. One source of 
concern at present is upward movement of interest 
rates in response to increasing inflationary pres-
sure.
From 3.5% in December 2010, the rate of in-
crease in consumer prices (year-on-year) rose to 
4.1% in January 2011, reflecting major increases 
Table 4  Suspended Savings Banks
January 14 Samwha Savings Bank
February 17 Busan Savings Bank, Daejeon Savings Bank
February 19
Busan II Savings Bank, Central Busan 
Savings Bank, Jeonju Savings Bank, Bohae 
Savings Bank
February 21 Domin Savings Bank
Source: Korea Financial Supervisory Service
Fig. 23  Apartment Sales in Seoul
Notes: The raw data was obtained from the Ministry of 
Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
Source: CEIC Data Base
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in food and transportation costs. On January 13, 
the government announced comprehensive price 
stabilization measures designed to keep the rate of 
increase below 4%. The main measures included 
(1) the freezing of public utility charges in the Na-
tional Capital Area during the first half of the year 
and the imposition of controls to prevent increases 
in regional public utility charges from exceeding 
rises in consumer prices, (2) the reduction of tar-
iffs of 67 key items, including sugar, maize and 
wheat, from January onwards, (3) the release of 
government stockpiles of agricultural products 
affected by declining supply volumes in order to 
restore the supply-demand balance. On January 
13, in a move apparently coordinated with these 
government measures, the Bank of Korea raised 
the policy interest rate from 2.50% o 2.75%. In-
flationary pressure intensified because of a global 
rise in raw material prices, and in February the 
rate of increase in consumer prices was even high-
er than January at 4.5%. In March it reached 4.7%. 
Since real interest rates are now negative, there is 
a strong possibility of further increases before the 
end of 2011.
(2) Concerns about the Impact of Rising In-
terest Rates
A factor that will need to be monitored closely 
from now on is the impact of higher interest rates 
on household budgets. The increased use of home 
equity loans in recent years is reflected in the level 
of household debt, which reached 836.6 trillion 
won at the end of 2009. The ratio of debt to dis-
posable income climbed to 1.43 times (Fig. 24). 
This is extremely high when compared with the 
U.S. ratio of 1.29 times.
As stated earlier, the non-performing loan ratio 
for real estate project loans increased dramatically 
in 2010. However, the ratios for lending to house-
holds as of December 2010 were 0.49% for home 
equity loans (0.38% in December 2009) and 0.97% 
for credit cards (1.11% in December 2009), indi-
cating the impact on households has been limited.
Defaults on sub-prime mortgages (home equity 
loans to people with high credit risk ratings) in 
the United States triggered a financial crisis that 
had grave repercussions for not only the Ameri-
can economy, but for the world economy. Mount-
ing household debt in South Korea has started to 
prompt fears of the impact of the worsening situ-
ation in the real estate market on household bud-
gets.
Shin [2010] states that the risk of major loan 
defaults is small for a number of reasons, includ-
ing (1) a reduction in the approved loan-to-value 
ratio from 35.97% in 2008 to 34.45% in 2009, (2) 
an increase in financial assets/financial liability ra-
tio resulting from the growth of personal financial 
assets, and (3) a decline in the percentage of lend-
ing to low-income people with limited repayment 
capacity. However, Shin [2010] also observes that 
consumption has started to come under pressure 
from a growing debt repayment burden.
An analysis by the Bank of Korea (Bank of 
Korea [2010]) suggests that while the household 
debt ratio is high, the situation has not yet reached 
a level that could jeopardize the stability of the 
financial system. Reasons for this conclusion in-
clude (1) the fact that quality of loans is generally 
good thanks to the tightening of housing loan reg-
ulations, such as the approved loan-to-value ratio 
and total debt retirement ratio, and (2) the fact that 
high-income people account for a large share of 
Fig. 24   Household Debt and 
Disposable Incomes
Source: Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Sys-
tem
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Three factors have been blamed for the sub-
prime mortgage problem in the United States. 
First, an uptrend in housing prices and slipshod 
credit checking led to the provision of large home 
equity loans to customers with low credit ratings. 
Second, most of these loans were provided with 
floating interest rates, albeit with fixed rates for 
limited periods. Third, securities backed by these 
loans were sold to a wide range of investors. In 
South Korea, housing loan regulations appear to 
have prevented the unbridled expansion of lend-
ing(16). At 46.2%, the average approved loan-to-
value ratio in South Korea is substantially lower 
than ratio in the United States at the time of the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis, which reached 79.4% 
(The Bank of Korea [2010]). Furthermore, while 
there has been some securitization of housing 
loans, there have been few cases of re-securitiza-
tion.
More significant is the increasing impact of ris-
ing interest rates on household budgets will in-
tensify. According to data from household budget 
surveys, interest payments have risen from 2.0% 
of the average expenditure of households (exclud-
ing single-person households) in 2003 to 2.4% 
in 2009 and 2.6% in 2010 (Fig. 26). We need to 
debt.
Yoo [2010] uses micro-data to analyze the cur-
rent levels of household debt for each income 
quintile. According to this analysis, debt is con-
centrated into Quintile 5 (29.3%), which repre-
sents the top 20%, and Quintile 4 (24.9%), which 
have average debt-income ratios (debt/annual 
income) of 0.9 and 0.8 respectively (Fig. 25).  In 
contrast, Quintile 1, which represents the lowest 
20%, accounts for only 8.0% of total debt but has 
the highest debt-income ratio at 1.0. Households 
with debt-income ratios of over 3.0 make up 2.7% 
of Quintile 5 and 10.7% of Quintile 1.
Assuming an interest rate of 10%, debt payment 
surplus ratios (debt repayments/disposable income 
－consumption expenditure) are estimated to be 
0.35 for Quintile 5, 0.04 for Quintile 2 and minus 
0.49 for Quintile 1. The conclusion is that while 
low debt repayment capacity of low- and middle-
income people is an issue, the risk is small since 
a large percentage of debt is concentrated in the 
hands of high-income people with substantial as-
sets. However, Yoo notes that 2.9% of households 
have debt-income ratios and capital gearing ratios 
(debt/financial assets) above 3.0, and that this risk 
factor needs to be monitored carefully.
Fig. 25   Household Debt by Income 
Level
Source: Kyeonwon Yoo [2010]
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Fig. 26   Interest Payments as a 
Percentage of Household 
Expenditure
Source: Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information 
Service
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wolse.
3. Some commentators have expressed doubts about the 
benefits of government intervention. For example, it has 
been claimed that higher transfer taxes and the limit on 
selling prices actually caused prices to rise because of 
the resulting reduction in the supply of housing. 
4. According to OECD [2007], the rate of increase in hous-
ing prices in South Korea is regarded as gradual, since 
the average yearly rate of increase in OECD members 
during the first five years of the 2000s was 42%.
5. In 2003, the policy interest rate was lowered in May and 
July in response to an economic slowdown caused by a 
slump in private consumption expenditure. In the second 
half of the year, there was an export-led improvement 
in economic performance. However, the situation dete-
riorated again after a slowdown in the world economy 
caused export growth to slow. The interest rate was cut 
in August and November 2004 to prevent the economy 
from stalling.
6. Companies are using experience and expertise gained 
through new town development in South Korea as the 
basis for an involvement in new town development proj-
ects in emerging countries. South Korea Korean contrac-
tors have won some of the contracts for a new town proj-
ect in Algeria. Five South Korean construction compa-
nies are jointly carrying out the construction work under 
the coordination of the Korea Land & Housing Corpora-
tion. In addition to housing, the project also includes the 
construction of parks, schools, hospitals, cultural and lei-
sure facilities. The Algerian government will build rail-
roads, expressways, water and wastewater systems and 
other infrastructure in the area around the new town. In 
Asia, this approach is being used in Vietnam and Cam-
bodia.
7. An old proverb from the dynastic era states that one 
should train people in Seoul and horses on Jeju Island. 
This proverb still seems to apply today, since many peo-
ple see education as a reason for relocating to Seoul.
8. Masashi Yamada [1997] compares the development of 
Bundang in South Korea and Tama New Town in Japan. 
He attributes the fact that a new town with a population 
of almost 400,000 was built at Bundang in just seven 
years from the announcement of the concept to the short 
period required for the acquisition of land.
9. According to Korea Housing Finance Corporation 
[2009], the average recipient of a Pokchapari loan is 37 
years old, has annual income of ¥34 million won and will 
use the loan, which has a repayment term of 18 years, to 
buy a 72 square meter home for 160 million won.
be aware first of all that although interest rates 
fell dramatically after the Lehman shock, debt re-
payment burdens increased. Furthermore, since 
most housing loans are subject to floating interest 
rates(17), any increase in interest rates is directly 
reflected in the interest payment burden.
If the effects of an increased debt repayment 
burden are compounded by income stagnation re-
sulting from deterioration in the income terms of 
trade (loss of income to other countries) due to 
rising primary product prices, economic decelera-
tion and other factors, the debt payment surplus 
ratios of households at middle-income level and 
below could fall sharply, leading to an increase in 
the amount of non-performing loans.
Conclusions
In this article we have analyzed the factors be-
hind the deteriorating situation in the South Ko-
rean real estate market and the impact of that de-
terioration. While the ongoing effects include a 
slump in the construction industry and financial 
problems for savings banks, the impact at pres-
ent is minimal compared with the consequences 
of collapsed housing bubbles in the United States, 
southern Europe and elsewhere. Government reg-
ulations governing real estate lending appear to 
have prevented the problem from escalating.
In addition, the response to the worsening fi-
nancial positions of savings banks was relatively 
prompt, and for this reason it seems unlikely that 
the situation will reach the stage at which the sta-
bility of the financial system could be jeopardized. 
However, anticipated interest rate rises will cause 
the debt repayment burden to increase, and if in-
come growth stagnates there could be a rapid de-
cline in the capacity of those at the middle-income 
level and below to repay debts. Future household 
budget trends will need to be monitored closely.
End Notes
1. See Mukoyama, H. [2010a], [2010b] for an analysis of 
this point.
2. This system was created when interest rates were high. 
In recent years, there has been a shift from chonse to 
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